Execution
How This Isn't Enron 2.0
| What killed it | Enron 1999 | Katsina 2014–2022 | JCM Lagos 2026+ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority | Lagos signed a deal it had no constitutional power to enforce | Federal-only PPA under NBET; state had no role | State-licensed under LASERC, post-2023 Electricity Act |
| Counterparty | NEPA, a federal monopoly with mixed incentives | NBET, federal counterparty with collapsed credit | Multiple private C&I customers under direct PPAs |
| FX structure | Dollar-priced diesel, naira revenue | Fixed USD tariff against depreciating naira | USD-indexed PPAs, carbon credit USD revenue, offshore buffer |
| Capital structure | Enron-style financial engineering | Federal guarantees that never materialized | Blended DFI senior debt with concessional anchor |
| Technology | Diesel barges, fuel import dependent | Solar with no battery; grid-dependent | Solar plus battery; behind-the-meter capable |
| Local capability | Foreign operator, no local partner | Pan Africa Solar partner but federally routed | Nigerian co-investor with 30 to 40% equity and board seats |
What is the same
JCM is still a foreign operator entering a frontier market with macroeconomic volatility. The naira is still depreciating. The federal grid is still unreliable. The cost of capital is still higher than for OECD projects. These conditions are accepted as the operating environment, not assumed away.
The deck answers the question it opened with
The Enron Lesson slide asked: who can succeed where Enron failed? The Katsina Lesson asked: what does JCM do differently than its own first attempt? Six rows above. The answer is not optimism. The answer is structure.
26 / 35JCM Power · Lighting Lagos · MBA 662