Appendix
D. Stakeholder Power-Interest Grid
Full detail behind the Mendelow power-interest grid in the Analysis section. Each stakeholder gets a power assessment, an interest assessment, a stated objective, and the JCM engagement approach.
High power, high interest (manage closely)
| Stakeholder | Power source | Interest in project | Engagement approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| JCM Power / SPV | Project sponsor; capital and governance | Direct equity return | Self |
| LASERC | Regulatory authority over licensing and wheeling | Successful implementation of state electricity market | Pre-application engagement from Month 1; quarterly compliance reporting |
| Lagos State Government | Political backing of the 2024 state law | Visible electricity reform success | Country head engagement at Commissioner level; semi-annual progress meetings |
| Nigerian co-investor | 30 to 40% equity, board seats, market access | Equity return; reputational benefit | JV agreement and supermajority governance; monthly executive committee |
| Anchor C&I customers (Tier 1 multinationals) | Customer; revenue source | Reliable power below diesel cost | Account management; 15-year PPA relationship |
High power, low interest (keep satisfied)
| Stakeholder | Power source | Interest in project | Engagement approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tinubu administration | Federal political authority over the Electricity Act | Reform legacy success | Indirect through LASERC and DFI lender relationships |
| NERC | Federal regulator of interstate operations | Sector-wide compliance | Quarterly information sharing; no direct dependency |
| Senior lenders (FinDev, EDC, IFC, AfDB) | Provide ~$100M senior debt | Debt service performance; ESG compliance | Quarterly reporting per loan covenants; project supervision missions |
Low power, high interest (keep informed)
| Stakeholder | Power source | Interest in project | Engagement approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| Host communities | Local social license | Local employment; community benefits | Community engagement plan per IFC Performance Standards; local hiring quotas |
| Carbon credit buyers (voluntary market) | Provide ~$2M/yr USD revenue | Verifiable emission reductions | NCCC and Verra registration; annual third-party verification |
| Ikeja and Eko Electric (DisCos) | Could lose C&I load to JCM | Defend customer base | Information sharing on wheeling arrangements; no direct dependency |
Low power, low interest (monitor)
| Stakeholder | Power source | Interest in project | Engagement approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| Generator distributors (Mikano, Mantrac) | Lose customer base over time | None specific to JCM | Industry-level observation only |
| Edo and Kaduna State Governments | Future expansion targets | Sector observation | Periodic information sharing as platform expands |
How the stakeholder map changed in 2023
Three positions moved when the Electricity Act passed.
Federal Government moved from "Manage closely as antagonist" to "Keep satisfied as reform sponsor." This is the single largest change and the reason the bypass strategy is viable.
State regulator (now LASERC) moved from "Did not exist with authority" to "High power, high interest." LASERC is the most important regulatory relationship for the project.
DisCos moved from "High power blocker" (could refuse to wheel) to "Low power observer" (LASERC handles state-level wheeling).
The Mendelow grid in the main deck shows the post-2023 positions. The pre-2023 positions are what made Enron and Katsina structurally impossible. The reform changed the grid; the grid is why the strategy works.